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IN THE SUPREME CO! IR'I OV THE STATE OF UTAH
[III-; STATE OF UTAH.

Plaintiff Appellee.
v.

(UNO MAESTAS.

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000094-SC
Priority No. 10

:

TEXT OF ADDITIONAL STATUTES AND RULES

The text of Utah Code Ann. § 64-1 3-20(3) (2000) and Article 1. section 28. Utah
Constitution is in Addendum A.

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT MAESTAS
CANNOT PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF HIS
IDENTIFICATION DEFENSE SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.

The state incorrectly claims that State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483. 487-494 (Utah
1986). provides the complete solution to problems caused by the unreliability of
identification testimony and allowing expert testimony would therefore imolve a

departure from precedent. State's brief ("S.B.") at 20-21. In Long, this Court did not
address the issue of whether expert testimony should be admitted when a cautionary

instruction is given. Instead, the only issue before this Court was whether Long's
conviction should be reversed because the trial court refused to give a cautionary
instruction, kh at 487. Despite the state's tortured attempt to demonstrate that this Court

resolved the current issue in Long (sec S.B. at 21. n.12), a review- of Long and the
decisions leading up to it establish that Long did not resolve this issue.

The slate asks this Court to regress to the pre-I.ong approach bv relviim on cases

which embrace thai outmoded approach in dclerminmg whether expert testimony should
be admitted in an eyewitness identilication case. See S.B. at 22. n.13. In fact, none of the
cases cited by the state for its proposition that a cautionary instruction serves the same
interests as expert testimony and expert testimony is therefore unnecessary, discuss at

length the problems inherent in eyewitness identification testimony outlined in Long. See
S.B. at 22. n.13: see e.<z.. Lewis v. Stale. 572 So.2d 908, 91 1(Fla. 199!) (per curiam)
(without discussing the problems with identilication testimony, court relied on a 1983

case and the ability ofjuries to perceive and remember in concluding the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing expert testimony): Commonwealth v. Kent. 696

N.E.2d 511.517-18 (Mass. 1998) (without embracing concerns in Long, court holds that

court properly excluded expert testimony because it was '"elementary, basic, and parallels
to a great extent the instructions the jurors receive from the judges in criminal cases'").
The state argues that State v. Buell. 489 N.E.2d 795. 803 (Ohio 1986). which held

that expert testimony is admissible, actually supports the state's argument because the

majority concluded the error was harmless. S.B. at 22-23. Although the majority
indicated that cross-examination, closing argument and an instruction helped in alerting
the jury to factors which affect reliability, it also pointed out that "evidence of defendant's
guilt was based primarily on physical evidence rather than identification testimony."

Buell, 489 N.E.2d at 804.' A harmless error review is not appropriate here because of the
interlocutory nature of the case and also because "the other evidence supporting the
conviction [is not] conclusive." State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376. ^j35.
People v. Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d 692. 699. 702 (N.Y. 1985) also supports Maestas*
position because while the expert could not opine as to whether a witness was credible,

due process required the expert be permitted to testify regarding the factors which affect
the reliability of the identifications.

The state incorrectly argues that substantial non-identification evidence linking
Maestas to the crimes exists because some of the witnesses testified that Maestas' voice

or gait was similar to that of the robber. S.B. at 23, n.14. Voice identification and

descriptions of how a person walks are identification testimony and therefore do not rise

to the level of substantial, independent corroborating evidence. See generally Long. 721

P.2d at 496 (cautionary instruction includes option of indicating that witness may use
sense other than sight to make an identification). Moreover, the remainder of the
evidence which supported Maestas' conviction was circumstantial and "not

overwhelming or conclusive." Maestas. 1999 UT 32, ^[35-36.

1One of the justices focused on the majority's resolution of the expert
identification testimony issue and indicated that he would reverse the capital homicide

conviction based on the error in precluding the defendant from presenting expert
testimony on factors which affected the reliability of identifications. Buell. 489 N.E.2d at
819 (Connors. J., dissenting).

An instruction, which provides guidelines for the jury but is not evidence, does not

serve the same function as expert testimony and fails to further Maestas' due process right
to present a defense. See A.B. at 28-30. Additional examples, not outlined in A.B. at 28-

30, support the notion that an instruction is not a substitute for expert testimony: (1) the

l^ng instruction tells the jury that it must consider whether the witness had an adequate
opportunity to observe, whereas the expert testimony outlines details regarding what the

studies have shown to be an adequate opportunity; (2) the instruction tells the jury to
consider "the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised"; the

expert testimony indicates that "even minor changes Tin appearance] can significantly
reduce the likelihood of later identification" and that subsequent identification without the
disguise can be as low as 9% (Dr. Dodd's letter ("Dodd") at 2); (3) the instruction tells the
jury to considerthe length of time the witnesses observed the actor, but it does not tell the

jury what length oftime the research has shown to be adequate; the testimony would tell

the jury that studies show that less than a minute makes correct identification less likely,
and witnesses often overestimate the amount oftime they viewed the actor (Dodd at 3).
The Ramirez hearing, cross-examination and closing arguments are also not a

substitute for expert testimony regarding the factors affecting the reliability of

identification testimony admitted at trial. The Ramirez hearing did not impact on the

identification testimony which was admitted and did not further Maestas' right to present
evidence in support of his defense. See A.B. at 28-30. Cross-examination allows defense

counsel to attempt to reach the inconsistencies and factors which undercut the reliability

of identifications but does not establish the significance of those factors and

inconsistencies: expert testimony is necessary to demonstrate such significance for the
jur\. Closing argument is not evidence and the jury is instructed that it is merelv
argument and should not be considered as evidence. In this case where identification is

the sole issue at trial and little other e\idence links Maestas to the crimes, expert
testimony is critical to Maestas' presentation of his defense.
POINT II. THE RULING THAT THE STATE MAY INTRODUCE
AT RETRIAL INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS MADE AS PART
OF THE SENTENCING PROCESS SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.

A. THE STATEMENTS IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT ("PSR")
ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE; AT RETRIAL.

The state argues that Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-20(3)(a) (2000) somehow expands
the limitation of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d> (19Q9). and

permits a judge to order the use of PSR's for any purpose, not just sentencing or
correctional purposes. S.B. at 46-48. The state's interpretation does not comport with
section 64-13-20(3)'s plain language and cannot be reached by accepted methods of
statutory construction. Section 64-13-20(3)(b) clarifies that PSR's can be used only bv
courts for sentencing purposes or by the Department of Corrections ("DOC") or Board for

correctional purposes. Subsection 3(a) indicates that PSR's are protected and can be
released either pursuant to DOC rules or. in the absence of such rules, bv court order.

Ihe entire subsection 3 read together limits the court order allowing release o( PSR's
referred to in subsection 3(a) to orders releasing I'SR's for sentencing or correctional
purposes. Additionally, the chapter in which section 64-13-20 is found deals with the

DOC and prison; it is therefore evident that section 64-13-20(3) is concerned with the use
of PSR's in the correctional system and does not extend the use beyond that context.

The state alternatively claims that even ifseclions 77-18-l(5)(d) and 64-13-20

preclude the use of the PSR at retrial. Maestas waived that protection when he

"substantially repealed] his presentence statements at the sentencing hearing." S.B. at

47. This claim fails because (1) Maestas did not substantially repeat the detail of his
statements made in the PSR and instead made a general statement of responsibdity at

sentencing (see Addendum I to A.B.); in fact, ifMaestas" statements at sentencing were
substantially similar to those in the PSR. the state would have no need to use the PSR

statements at retrial: (2) even if Maestas had substantially repeated his statements, the

relevant statutes and the policy they serve are best furthered by not allowing use of PSR
statements at retrial: the goal of a full and fair sentencing hearing with complete
information, including the defendant's assessment ofthe offense, would be unattainable if

PSR's were freely disseminated after being discussed al sentencing2; (3) because PSR's
: In IInitcd States Department of Justice v. Julian. 486 U.S. 1. 12 (1988). the Court
recognized that federal courts are reluctant to disclose contents of PSR's beyond the

intended use because ofthe chilling effect ofsuch disclosure on the willingness of
individuals to give information and because of the need to protect the confidentiality of
the report.

are necessarily discussed as part of sentencing. Maestas' reference It) the PSR and general

reiteration of the statements therein did not waive the protection afforded such reports:
the protection afforded PSR's would be meaningless if a defendant could waive that
protection by discussing the PSR at sentencing: and (4) just as Maestas did not waive his

right against self-incrimination when lie spoke at sentencing, he did not knowimih and
voluntarily waive the statutory protection afforded PSR's.
B. MAESTAS' STATEMENTS MADE AS PART OF THE
SENTENCING PROCESS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE AT RETRIAL.

Relying essentially on the Ilarvey cases. Harvey v. State. 835 P.2d 1074 (Wvo.

1992) (Harvev 1): Harvev v. Shillin»er. 893 F.Snpp 1021. 1024-30 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(Harvev II); Harvev v. Shillinger. 76 F.3d 1528. 1534-37 (10"'Cir. 1996) (Harvev III).
and McOautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). vacated 40$ U.S. 941 (1972). the state

claims pertinent authority supports its claim that admission of Maestas' sentencing
statements does not violate due process or the privilege against self-incrimination. S.B. at

29-3 1. The cases cited by the state are not directly on point, however, and fail to provide
convincing and reasoned analysis in support of the state's position.
The I larvey line of cases involved significantly different circumstances from those

in the present case and therelbre provide little guidance. First, Harvey's statements were
considered voluntary because he conceded thai thev had been voluntarily made.
Harvev HE 76 F.3d at 1536. In addition, unlike Utah where a defendant can be sentenced

more harshly if he does not take responsibility for a crime. Ilarvey could not have been
penalized for remaining silent at sentencing. In fact, the Harvey I court recognized that

incriminating statements made at sentencing would not be voluntary if a defendant could
be penalized for silence. Harvey I. 835 P.2d at 1083.

In addition. Harvey's statements knowingly waived the privilege because "I larvev

knew that anything he said could be used as evidence against him." Ilarvey III. 76 F.3d
at 1536. Ilarvey "s sentencing statements were made under oath and were not used in the

same case after a reversal on appeal. By contrast, Maestas was not under oath and the
statements are to be used in the same case after his convictions were reversed on direct

appeal, (liven the uncertainly in the law in this area, it cannot be presumed that Maestas
knew that these statements could be used at retrial.

McGautha. 402 U.S. at 213-220,3 extended the long-established rule that a
defendant who testifies at trial waives the right against cross-examination to trials where

guilt and punishment are determined in a single proceeding. The analysis and policy
concerns in McGautha were different from those here; tne Court was not concerned with

whether, under the totality of circumstances, the privilege had been waived when a
defendant made an unsworn statement at sentencing. Instead, the McGautha court

; Crampton v. Ohio was decided with McCiautha. Although the Fifth Amendment
discussion in McCiautha refers to Crampton's case. Appellant uses the official citation.

McGauthav. California, throughout this brief. McCiautha was vacated on rehearing in
light offurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 2726 (1972).

focused on whether to extend the established rule that a defendant who testifies at trial

can be cross-examined, to trials where guilt and punishment were decided at the same

time. Given the distinct focus in McGautha and the evolution in the law which precludes
such unitary proceedings in capital cases. McCiautha provides little support for the state.1
By contrast. Appellant provides strong support for not admitting his sentencing
statements at retrial. Among the cases supporting Maestas' analysis are State v. Drake,
552 A.2d 780 (Vt. 1988) (defendant's allocution statements are not admissible at

subsequent proceedings): Mitchell v. United States. 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (guiltv plea does
not wai\e privilege against self-incrimination tor sentencing purposes): State v. Sargent,

762 P.2d 1127 (Wash. 1988) (admission of statements made to presentence investigator at
retrial violated the Fifth Amendment): and even Harvey I. 835 P.2d at 1083 (recognizing
that Fifth Amendment would be violated by admission of defendant's statements made at
sentencing if sentencer could have imposed harsher sentence if defendant remained

silent). Due process and the Fifth Amendment require that the state not be allowed to use
Maestas' sentencing statements to prove its case at retrial.

L Maestas' Statements Did Not Knowingly and Voluntarily Waive the
Privilege Against Self-incrimination.

a. Maestas 'Incriminating Statements Were Compelled Because He Could
Be Sentenced More Harshly If He Did Not C'on/ess.

4State v. Kelbach.461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969). vacated408 U.S. 935 (1972). with

no analysis, reached a conclusion similar to that in McCiautha. Kcibach provides no
guidance for the same reasons that McGautha does not provide guidance in this case.

Statements are not voluntary when the defendant does not have a meaningful
choice between speaking and remaining silent: in other words, statements are not

voluntary where a defendant may be penalized for exercising the privilege against selfincrimination. See .United States v. Perez-Franco. 873 F.2d 455. 463 (U Cir. 1989)

(citing inter alia Minnesota v. Murphy. 465 U.S. 420. 429(1984)). For example.
statements to a presentence investigator taking responsibility for crimes which were

dismissed in a plea bargain are compelled, not voluntary, if the defendant will be

penalized under sentencing guidelines lor not taking such responsibility. See PerezFranco, 873 I .2d at 463; see also LelLowitz v. Cunningham. 431 U.S.801 (1977) (if

government penalizes individual for exercising privilege, any statements made by

individual are compelled); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273. 278-29 (1968) (requiring
officer to make statements to grand jury or lose his job violated privilege).
In Harvexi, 835 P.2d at 1083, the court acknowledged that its holding that
statements made at sentencing were admissible in a future trial on a different charge

would not apply if the defendant had been required to take responsibility for the crime at
sentencing in order to receive a more lenient sentence. 14 Fhe reason a confession made
at sentencing in the hope of leniency would not be admissible is that such a statement

"would amount to lgenuine compulsion of testimoin" in violation of the right against
self-incrimination." kL (citations omitted).

At the sentencing in this case, the state argued that the eight five-to-life sentences

should run consecutively and that the judge had the option of imposing the one-vear
tircarm enhancement or the greater enhancement that "could be as much as the years"

(R. 53"). Immediately after the prosecutor argued for this harsh sentence, the trial judge

asked Maestas whether he had a statement to make <R. 537). Maestas responded by
taking responsibility for the crimes and asking for leniency (R. 537-38). In addition to
allowing a trial judge to impose a harsher sentence based on a defendant's failure to take
responsibility for a crime (State \. Sihert. 310 P.2d 388. 393 (Utah 1957)). this Court has

held that a defendant's acceptance of responsibility is a factor which the trial court should
consider in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. See State v. Galli. 967

P.2d 930. 938 (Utah 1998)(overturning consecutive sentences based in part on
defendant's acceptance of responsibility). Unlike the defendant in Harvev I. Maestas was

compelled to make incriminating statements at sentencing because b\ doing so. he

increased the possibility that he would receive concurrent sentences, or even probation, as
well as the lesser firearm enhancement."

The state's argument throughout its brief is premised for the most part on the
assumption that Maestas' incriminating statements at sentencing are an accurate retlection
of the facts, and that because Maestas confessed at sentencing after denying involvement
at trial, the due process requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt through its own resources, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the fairness
protections afforded defendants have no application in this case. S.B. at 13. 28. 41. 49.

In fact, the state argues that fairness requires that the sentencing statements be admitted at
trial because Maestas "lied to the jury", but later "sought leniency from the trial court bv
admitting he committed the offenses." S.B. at 49.
Although the state assumes the allocution statements are accurate, the testimony at
trial was made under oath whereas the statement at sentencing was not (R. 537). Because

Despite recent Utah case law which indicates that a defendant's acceptance of
responsibility weighs significantly in favor of concurrent sentences, the stale argues that

Maestas' statements were not compelled because he had only a "dim hope" of better
treatment. S.B. at 41-2. n. 19. The record demonstrates, however, that the trial judge

ordered that only counts 1and 11 were to be served consecutively whereas the remaining
counts were to be served concurrently: moreover, the trial judge imposed the lesser one-

year firearm enhancement (R. 114-129). The fact that the trial judge did not impose the
absolute maximum demonstrates that Maestas did stand to benefit from accepting
responsibility. Moreover, even if Maestas had only a "dim hope" of receiving a more

lenient sentence, such a hope constitutes coercion under Utah's sentencing system where
a judge can sentence more harshly if a defendant does not accept responsibility.

The cases cited by the state do not support its claim that Maestas' incriminating
statements at sentencing were not compelled. See S.B. at 41. n. 19. McGautha. did not

address the circumstances in this case. Instead, the issue was whether the long-standing

rule that a defendant who testifies at trial can be cross-examined violated the privilege
where both guilt and punishment were decided in a single proceeding. The Court

a defendant who does not take responsibility at sentencing can be sentenced more harshly
sentencing proceedings are inherently coercive and encourage incriminating statements.
Utah's system encourages a defendant faced with consecutive sentences to take

responsibility for the crimes even if he did not do them: this undercuts the reliability of
such statements and further indicates that they should not be relied on bv the state to
prove its ease.

extended the established rule to trials where both guilt and punishment were decided in a

single proceeding. McGautha. 402 U.S. at 214-26. In extending that rule, the Court
reasoned that the defendant's attorney could make a plea for life if the defendant did not
testify. Id. at 219. The present case does not involve an extension of the rule that a

defendant who testifies under oath at trial waives his right not to be cross-examined:
instead, it involves an examination of the circumstances under which Maestas made

allocution statements to determine whether Maestas waived the privilege against selfincrimination so as to allow the admission of his sentencing statements at retrial.
Murphy. 465 U.S. at 436-38. likewise does not support the state's claim. See S.B.
at 41. n.19. In fact, when Murphy is read in its entirety, it supports Maestas' claim that

his statements at sentencing were compelled. The Murphy Court based its holding that
Murphy was not compelled to make incriminating statements regarding other crimes to
his probation officer on the fact that under Minnesota law, there is no direct or indirect

penalty imposed for exercising the right to silence with a probation officer. Had there

been a direct or indirect penalty for remaining silent with a probation officer regarding
new crimes, the statements would have been unconstitutionally compelled. Murphy. 465
U.S. at 436-39. Since Utah allows defendants who do not take responsibility to be
penalized at sentencing, Murphy indicates that such sentencing statements are not
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment.

State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221. 225-26 (Utah 1989) (S.B. at 41, n.19). also does not

support the state's position because it clarities that a confession is involuntary ifa
defendant is threatened with a higher charge if he does not confess. See also State v.
Rettenberger. 1999 IFF 80, 984 P.2d 1009.1J29.

Finally. Harvey III. 76 F.3d at 1536, n.5, does not support the state's argument that
Maestas' statements were voluntary because: (1)1 larvey conceded that his allocution
statement was voluntary (hL at 1536); no such concession exists in this case; and (2) a
Wyoming court cannot "require a defendant to confess to criminal activities in his

allocution in return for a more lenient sentence." Harvey 1. 835 P.2d at 1083 . By
contrast, failure to confess is a basis for imposing a harsher sentence in Utah.
b. Maestas ' Statements Were Not Voluntary Because He Was Forced to
Choose Between Competing Rights.

Maestas had Article I, sections 7 and 12 rights to speak at sentencing, and since

Maestas exercised his right to speak at sentencing, federal due process required that he be

allowed to speak.6 See A.B. at 41-43. Id Moreover, Maestas had a due process right to
a full and fair sentencing. See Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 341 (1949) (recognizing
full and fair sentencing hearing which allows sentencer to impose a sentence which fits
the offender and the crime is required by due process); State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241.

A delendant's right to make an unsworn statement at sentencing is recognized by
rule, statute or state constitution in most jurisdictions. LaFave, Wayne R.. Israel, Jerold,
and King, Nancy J., criminal procedure, § 26.4(g) (1984) ("LaFave"). "Despite this
widespread acceptance, the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether silencing a
defendant who wishes to speak at sentencing is constitutional error." Id at 779.
According to LaFave, "state and federal courts are split on this issue." kL, n.125.
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1247 (Utah 1980) ("fundamental fairness requires that [sentencing procedures] be
designed to insure that the decision making process is based on accurate information" and

punishment fits crime and defendant): State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985) (state

due process requires that sentence be based on reliable and relevant information regarding
various factors). The state's position forces a defendant to give up these rights and forego
a full and fair sentencing hearing in order to preserve the right to appeal and a fair trial on
retrial if a case is reversed. Just as forcing a defendant to make a choice between Fourth
and Fifth Amendment protections was unacceptable in Simmons v. United States. 390
U.S. 377. 393-94 (1968). this choice in unacceptable.
In support of its argument that forcing such a choice on criminal defendants is no

big deal and merely one ofthe hard choices of being a defendant, the state again relies on
McGautha and the spin given that case in the Harvey decisions. S.B. at 33-36. While the
right to remain silent was "chilled" in McGautha. the Court did not believe that the

impact differed significantly from that in any criminal case where a defendant was

required to choose between testifying at trial and foregoing the right against crossexamination. McCiautha. 402 U.S. at 213. Each case must be assessed independently,
however, to determine "whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent
any of the policies behind the rights involved." Id.

The policies behind the guarantee of a full and fair sentencing hearing are to
ensure that defendants are treated with fairness and dignity and that an individualized
15

sentence is imposed which fits the crime, the defendant's background and other

circumstances. Williams. 337 U.S. at 247. Such an approach serves society's interests by
rehabilitating individuals where appropriate, thereby restoring some offenders "sooner to
complete freedom and useful citizenship." EL In a time when prisons are overcrowded

and expensive to run, the due process requirement ofa full and fair sentencing hearing
plays a critical role in helping to identify which offenders are most likely tc be
rehabilitated by either probation or shorter concurrent sentences. The right to a full and

fair sentencing hearing is severely undermined ifa defendant stands mute at sentencing in
order to preserve his right to appeal and subsequent right to a fair retrial. Conversely, the
right to appeal and the right to a fair trial where the state proves through its own resources

that the defendant committed the crime are basic to our system ofjustice. Allowing the
use of a defendant's statements at sentencing on retrial after the case is reversed
eviscerates these rights.

c. Maestas Did not Knowingly Waive The Privilege Against Selfincrimination.

Despite the state's attempts to convince this Court that Maestas "was almost

certainly advised of his rights when he was arrested" and "it is inconceivable that trial

counsel did not discuss with defendant the dangers of testifying" (S.B. at 41), the record

does not demonstrate either ofthese claims. Given the presumption against waiver and
the state's burden to establish that waiver occurred, neither of these presumptions can be

made. See State v. Allen. 839 P.2d 291. 300 (Utah 1992) (burden of establishing waiver
is on the state). Additionally. Maestas did not "testify"; unlike Harvey. Maestas was not
under oath and instead made an unsworn statement at sentencng. Given the uncertainty
of the law in this area, it cannot be presumed that a lawyer would advise his client that
sentencing statements would be used at retrial if the case were reversed. Moreover, this

trial lawyer was ineffective at trial and failed to file a timely notice of appeal. R. 138-39.
Under such circumstances, it cannot be presumed the lawyer advised Maestas that his
sentencing statements would be used against him at retrial if his case were overturned on
appeal.

The Harvey 111, 76 F.3d at 1536. analysis assumes without elaboration that a

defendant who speaks at sentencing knows that his statements can be used against him in
a different case. While such an assumption is questionable, it does not pertain to the
present case where the state seeks to use the statements in the same case at retrial. Given

the fact that this is a case of first impression, such sentencing statements have not been
historically admitted on retrial, and even lawyers would be shocked to learn that such a

statement could be used after the case is reversed on appeal, it cannot be assumed that
Maestas "knew" that his statements made at sentencing would be used against him at a
new trial obtained after reversal of his conviction on appeal.
2. Anv Waiver Was Limited to the Use of Maestas' Statements for

Sentencing Purposes.
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The state essential!} ignores the recent decision in Mitchell v. United States. 526

U.S. 314 (see S.B. at 42 n. 20). which held that the scope ofthe waiver of the privilege at
a guilty plea colloquy docs not extend to sentencing. In fact, "[t]reating a guilty plea as a
waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of
defendants." kL at 324. The Court was concerned that if a guilty plea did waive the
privilege for sentencing purposes, thereby allowing the government to obtain information
from the defendant which was relevant to a harsher sentence, the defendant would

become "an instrument in his or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition
and vital principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the

Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power."
Mitchell. 526 U.S. at 325 (citation omitted).
In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned:

There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea
colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. Unlike the
defendant taking the stand, who "cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth
Amendment gives him . . . immunity from cross-examination on the matters

he has himself put in dispute," (citation omitted], the defendant who pleads
guilty puts nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense.

Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute, often making a
joint statement with the prosecution or confirming the prosecution's version
of the facts. Under these circumstances, there is little danger that the court
will be misled by selective disclosure.
UFat 1312.

Mitchell supports limiting the scope of any waiver which occurs when a defendant
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makes a statement at sentencing to use ofthat statement for sentencing purposes. .lust as
M[t]here is no convincing reason" (see kL) for extending the waiver which occurs at the

plea colloquy beyond that hearing, "[tjhere is no convincing reason" (see kF) for allowing
the state to shirk its due process responsibility to prove a crime by admitting a
defendant's incriminating statements at retrial if the conviction is overturned. A

defendant who makes an allocution statement is not "testifying"; indeed. Maestas'
statement was not made under oath, subjected to cross-examination, or used for any
purpose other than providing the trial court with more complete information for

sentencing purposes. To some extent, when Maestas took responsibility, he simply
confirmed the state's version of the facts. These circumstances are therefore similar to

those in Mitchell and require that the scope of the waiver be limited to use of the
incriminating statements for sentencing purposes.

3. Policy Reasons Which Justify Limiting Statements Made at Sentencing
to Use for Sentencing Purposes are Similar to the Policy Reasons Which
Support Limiting the Use of Statements Which Are Made as Part of the
Plea Bargaining Process.

Tavlor v. Singletarv. 148 F.3d 1276. 1282, n.6 (5lh Cir. 1998), refers to the

discussion in Gunshv v. Wainwright. 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1979), regarding whether a
the defendant's deposition given after a plea bargain failed was involuntary; Tavlor does

not impact on the Gunsby holding that statements made to the prosecutor while a plea
bargain was in place did not voluntarily waive the privilege. See S.B. at 43; A.B. at 38.
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In any event, the rationale for not allowing statements made as part ofa plea

bargain to be admissible if the plea bargain fails is similar to the rationale for disallowing
use of a defendant's incriminating statements at retrial. In both circumstances, "the
conviction which created the forum for the allocution . . . was reversed" (Harvey I. 835
P.2d at 1094 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting)); since the invalidated conviction '"is deemed never
to have existed'", incriminating statements made in reliance on the conviction are not

admissible. Id. (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

Additionally, when a defendant speaks out at sentencing, the trial court is better

able to impose a fair and considered sentence which benefits society, judicial integrity,
and the individual defendant. One of the easiest ways for a judge to assess whether the
defendant has remorse or takes responsibility for a crime is to allow allocution at
sentencing. Requiring that statements made at sentencing are not admissible if the

conviction is later overturned facilitates a full sentencing hearing without impacting in
any way on the evidence which the state has gathered.
4. Maestas' Incriminating Statements Were the "Fruit" of the Unlawful
Convictions.

The "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis embraced in Harrison v. United States.

392 U.S. 219(1968), applies in this case because: (1) the probation agent who

interviewed Maestas and asked for information about the offense was a state agent (see
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-20 (2000) (DOC agents prepare PSR's); Sargent. 762 P.2d 1127
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(Fifth Amendment was violated where confession made to presentence investigator was
admitted at retrial and probation officer did not give Miranda warnings prior to
presentence review)); the subsequent sentencing statements flowed from that presentence
interview: (2) the doctrine applies tojudicial proceedings. See Harvey I. 835 P.2d at
1096 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) ("If Harrison means anything. ... it is that, like the

repressed first trial testimony, an illegal conviction cannot produce admissible evidence
upon retrial . . . .")

5. The Victims Rights Amendment Flas No Application to this Issue.

As a final matter, the state asserts that suppressing Maestas' statements would

result in a denial of the victims' rights. S.B. at 50. Without analysis, the state merely
quotes subsection 1(a) of the Utah constitutional "Declaration of the rights of crime
victims." then baldly asserts that victims would be treated unfairly if Maestas'

incriminating statements are suppressed.7 S.B. at 50. The state's failure to analyze this
issue, provide any support for its claims, or provide citations to the record indicating that

this issue was discussed below fails to meet the briefing requirements of Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) and Utah R. App. P. 24(b). See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)

("bald citation to authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis

7While the state correctly quotes the language of subsection 1(a) of the
Declaration, it does not even cite to the correct constitutional provision. The "Declaration
of the rights of crime victims" is found in Article I. section 28 of the Utah Constitution,
not Article L section 23, as cited by the state.
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based on that authority" does not meet briefing requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)).
Because the state has not adequately briefed this claim, this Court should refuse to review

it. See id. at 305: see also State v. Montoya. 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997); Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) applicable to brief of Appellee pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(b).
In Montova, 937 P.2d at 150, the Court of Appeals declined to address an

argument raised by the state for the first time in its response brief, stating:
A well-briefed argument is most essential for an issue raised by
appellee for the first time on appeal because the new issue has not been

addressed by the parties below and thus record support for the unaddressed
argument is critical. Additionally. "*[i]f the court is not supplied with the
proper tools to decide cases, then extremely valuable time, already severely
rationed, must be diverted from substantive work' into less productive
tasks, [citations omitted]."

kL Additionally, in the absence of an adequately briefed argument, the chance that the

appellate court will issue case law which must later be clarified increases significantly.
Although the Victims' Rights Amendment went into effect January 1. 1995. it has
been subjected to very little appellate review.8 This Court should refuse to move into this

area of first impression where the state has failed to adequately briefits argument or to
otherwise provide support for such a far-flung interpretation of the constitutional
provision. In addition, even if this Court were to reach the substance of" the state's claim

*State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30 (Utah App. 1996), in which the Court of
Appeals considered whether the victim's presence at a juvenile trial violated the

defendant's right to a fair trial, is the only Utah appellate decision discussing the
amendment.
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that claim fails because Article I. section 28 does not provide the protection advocated bv
the state. Indeed, the amendment does not suggest that the rights of victims override the
constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants or that in order to treat victims

fair!). courts must aid the state in obtaining a conviction by admitting a defendant's
statements obtained at sentencing. Furthermore, conducting a lair trial under applicable
rules, statutes and constitutional provisions results in fair treatment to botli victims and
defendants since victims have an interest in reliable convictions.

The focus of the Victim Rights' Amendment is on preserving the di»nitv of

victims by including them more in the process by giving them notice of proceedings, and
allowing them to be present and or give input under certain circumstances. I itah Const.
Art. 1. § 28. This focus is evident in the Rights of Crime Victims Act found in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-38-1 through 14 (1999). Neither the Act nor the constitutional amendment

suggests that issues regarding the constitutional or statutory admissibility of evidence
should be decided on the basis advocated by the state.

6. 'This Court Could Also 1ise Its Inherent Supervisory Power to Preclude
Admission of Such Statements.

Although the state and federal constitutions and Utah statutes preclude the use of
Maestas' statements at retrial, this Court could also exercise its inherent supervisory
power to hold that a criminal defendant's statements made at sentencing or as part of the
presentence investigation are not admissible at retrial following reversal of a conviction

^,1

on appeal. This Court has sua sponte exercised its inherent supervisory powers in

resolving issues where fairness and policy considerations require a certain approach
regardless of whether such an approach is constitutionally or statutorily mandated. See
Slate v. Bennett. 999 P.2d 1. 2000 UT 34, \\ 3 (Durham, J., concurring in the result)
(listing numerous circumstances under which this Court has exercised its inherent

supervisory power). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized that it has "inherent
supervisory authority over all courts of this state" (State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256.

1266. 1271-72 (Utah 1993)) and has utilized that power in criminal cases to ensure that

proceedings in the trial court are conducted in a fair and consistent manner. See e^ State
y, Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal Investigation. '1{h Dist. Court
No.CS-1.754P.2d633. 653 (Utah 1988).

Important considerations support using this Court's inherent supervisory powers to
preclude the use ofa defendant's statements which are made at sentencing in a

subsequent retrial. These considerations include, among other things: (I) the importance

ofa full and fair sentencing hearing, and the fact that defendants who are appealing their
cases would not speak at sentencing if this Court were to hold that such allocution

statements are admissible on retrial; (2) the unfairness of using the statements of a

defendant who speaks out at sentencing against him if the conviction is overturned. (3)
concerns about the reliability of incriminating statements made at sentencing after
conviction where such statements are not made under oath, and are often made because

otherwise the defendant can be sentenced more harshly, and (4) the due process
requirement that the state, with all of its resources, prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt and the importance ofthat requirement. In order to preserve the right to appeal, the
right to a fair trial, the right against self-incrimination and the right to a full and fair

sentencing hearing, among others, this Court should at the very least hold pursuant to its
supen-isory power, that a defendant's statements made at sentencing are not admissible
after the case is reversed on appeal.
CONCLUSION

Defendant/Appellant Gino Maestas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the

trial court's interlocutory orders and (1) allow Appellant the opportunity to introduce
expert testimony in support of his identification defense, and (2) preclude the state's use
of his sentencing statements at retrial.
SUBMITTED this _£& day of March, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT

SCOTT C.WILLIAMS

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investiga
tions and diagnostic evaluations.
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports
prepared by the department are protected as defined in Section 63-2-304

and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or
by rules made by the Department of Corrections.

(b) The reports are intended only for use by:
(i) the court in the sentencing process;
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole in its decisionmaking respon
sibilities; and
(in) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treat
ment of the offender.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 28.

[Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

(1) lb preserve and protect victims'rights to justice and due process, victims
of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) Tb be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from

harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and to be heard at
important criminal justice hearings related to the victim, either in person
or through a lawful representative, once a criniinal information or
indictment charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and

(c) lb have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of imposing an appro
priate sentence, receive and consider, without evidentiary limitation,
reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of
a person convicted of an offense except that this subsection does not apply
to capital cases or situations involving privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action
for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment.

(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony crimes and such
other crimes or acts, including juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may
provide.

(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and define this section
by statute.

